



APPENDIX 1

SCOTTISH BORDERS COUNCIL

TREASURY MANAGEMENT MID-YEAR REPORT 2021/22

1. BACKGROUND

a) Treasury management is defined as:

“The management of the local authority’s investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks”.

b) The Council operates a balanced budget, which broadly means cash raised during the year will meet its cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operations is to ensure this cash flow is adequately planned, with surplus monies being invested in low risk counterparties, providing security and adequate liquidity, before considering optimising investment return.

c) The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council’s capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure the Council can meet its capital spending operations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, where favourable conditions exist, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

d) **Annex A** contains a summary of the updated Prudential and Treasury Management Indicators for 2021/22 as highlighted throughout this report.

2 ECONOMIC POSITION

2.1 ECONOMIC UPDATE *(from Link Group)*

At the meeting on 24th September the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted unanimously to leave Bank Rate unchanged at 0.10% and made no changes to its programme of quantitative easing purchases due to finish by the end of this year at a total of £895bn; two MPC members voted to stop the last £35bn of purchases as they were concerned that this would add to inflationary pressures.

There was a major shift in the tone of the MPC’s minutes at this meeting from the previous meeting in August which had majored on indicating that some tightening in monetary policy was now on the horizon, but also not wanting to stifle economic recovery by too early an increase in Bank Rate. In his press conference after the August MPC meeting, Governor Andrew Bailey said, “the challenge of avoiding a steep rise in unemployment has been replaced by that of ensuring a flow of labour into jobs” and that “the Committee will be monitoring closely the incoming evidence regarding developments in the labour market, and particularly unemployment, wider measures of slack, and underlying wage pressures.” In other words, it was flagging up a potential danger that labour shortages could push up wage growth by more than it expects and that, as a result, CPI inflation would stay above the 2% target for longer. It also discounted sharp increases in monthly inflation figures in the pipeline in late 2021 which were largely propelled by events a year ago e.g., the cut in VAT in August 2020 for the hospitality industry, and by temporary shortages which would eventually work their way out of the system: in other words, **the MPC had been prepared to look through a temporary spike in inflation.**

So, in August the country was just put on alert. However, this time the MPC’s words indicated there had been a marked increase in concern that more recent increases in prices, particularly the increases in gas and electricity prices in October and due again next April, are, indeed, likely to lead to **faster and higher inflation expectations and**

underlying wage growth, which would in turn increase the risk that price pressures would prove more persistent next year than previously expected. Indeed, to emphasise its concern about inflationary pressures, the MPC pointedly chose to reaffirm its commitment to the 2% inflation target in its statement; this suggested that it was now willing to look through the flagging economic recovery during the summer to prioritise bringing inflation down next year. This is a reversal of its priorities in August and a long way from words at earlier MPC meetings which indicated a willingness to look through inflation overshooting the target for limited periods to ensure that inflation was ‘sustainably over 2%’. Indeed, whereas in August the MPC’s focus was on getting through a winter of temporarily high energy prices and supply shortages, believing that inflation would return to just under the 2% target after reaching a high around 4% in late 2021, now its primary concern is that underlying price pressures in the economy are likely to get embedded over the next year and elevate future inflation to stay significantly above its 2% target and for longer.

Financial markets are now pricing in a first increase in Bank Rate from 0.10% to 0.25% in February 2022, but this looks ambitious as the MPC has stated that it wants to see what happens to the economy, and particularly to employment once furlough ends at the end of September. At the MPC’s meeting in February it will only have available the employment figures for November: to get a clearer picture of employment trends, it would need to wait until the May meeting when it would have data up until February. At its May meeting, it will also have a clearer understanding of the likely peak of inflation.

The **MPC’s forward guidance on its intended monetary policy** on raising Bank Rate versus selling (quantitative easing) holdings of bonds is as follows: -

1. Placing the focus on raising Bank Rate as “the active instrument in most circumstances”.
2. Raising Bank Rate to 0.50% before starting on reducing its holdings.
3. Once Bank Rate is at 0.50% it would stop reinvesting maturing gilts.
4. Once Bank Rate had risen to at least 1%, it would start selling its holdings.

COVID-19 vaccines. These have been the game changer which have enormously boosted confidence that **life in the UK could largely return to normal during the summer** after a third wave of the virus threatened to overwhelm hospitals in the spring. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March 2020, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for services in hard hit sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels. The big question is whether mutations of the virus could develop which render current vaccines ineffective, as opposed to how quickly vaccines can be modified to deal with them and enhanced testing programmes be implemented to contain their spread.

US. See comments below on US treasury yields.

EU. The slow roll out of vaccines initially delayed economic recovery in early 2021 but the vaccination rate has picked up sharply since then. After a contraction in GDP of -0.3% in Q1, Q2 came in with strong growth of 2%, which is likely to continue into Q3, though some countries more dependent on tourism may struggle. Recent sharp increases in gas and electricity prices have increased overall inflationary pressures but the ECB is likely to see these as being only transitory after an initial burst through to around 4%, so is unlikely to be raising rates for a considerable time.

German general election. With the CDU/CSU and SPD both having won around 24-26% of the vote in the September general election, the composition of Germany’s next coalition government may not be agreed by the end of 2021. An SPD-led coalition would probably pursue a slightly less restrictive fiscal policy, but any change of direction from a CDU/CSU led coalition government is likely to be small. However, with Angela Merkel standing down as Chancellor as soon as a coalition is formed, there will be a hole in overall EU leadership which will be difficult to fill.

China. After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1 2020, economic recovery was strong in the rest of the year; this enabled China to recover all the initial contraction. During 2020, policy makers both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that was particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors helped to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies during 2020 and earlier in 2021. However, the pace of economic growth has now fallen back after this initial surge of recovery from the pandemic and China is now struggling to contain the spread of the Delta variant through sharp local lockdowns - which will also depress economic growth. There are also questions as to how effective Chinese vaccines are proving. In addition, recent regulatory actions motivated by a political agenda to channel activities into officially approved directions, are also likely to reduce the dynamism and long-term growth of the Chinese economy.

Japan. 2021 has been a patchy year in combating Covid. However, after a slow start, nearly 50% of the population are now vaccinated and Covid case numbers are falling. After a weak Q3 there is likely to be a strong recovery in Q4. The Bank of Japan is continuing its very loose monetary policy but with little prospect of getting inflation back above 1% towards its target of 2%, any time soon: indeed, inflation was negative in July. New Prime Minister Kishida has promised a large fiscal stimulus package after the November general election – which his party is likely to win.

World growth. World growth was in recession in 2020 but recovered during 2021 until starting to lose momentum more recently. Inflation has been rising due to increases in gas and electricity prices, shipping costs and supply shortages, although these should subside during 2022. It is likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a reversal of **world globalisation** and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China to supply products, and vice versa. This is likely to reduce world growth rates from those in prior decades.

Supply shortages. The pandemic and extreme weather events have been highly disruptive of extended worldwide supply chains. At the current time there are major queues of ships unable to unload their goods at ports in New York, California and China. Such issues have led to mis-distribution of shipping containers around the world and have contributed to a huge increase in the cost of shipping. Combined with a shortage of semi-conductors, these issues have had a disruptive impact on production in many countries. Many western countries are also hitting up against a difficulty in filling job vacancies. It is expected that these issues will be gradually sorted out, but they are currently contributing to a spike upwards in inflation and shortages of materials and goods on shelves.

2.2 INTEREST RATE FORECAST

The Council's treasury advisor, Link Group, provided the following forecasts on 29th September 2021 (PWLB rates are certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80bps):

Link Group Interest Rate View		29.9.21								
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70
6 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80
12 month ave earnings	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00
5 yr PWLB	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70
10 yr PWLB	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10
25 yr PWLB	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60
50 yr PWLB	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40

Additional notes by Link on this forecast table: -

- LIBOR and LIBID rates will cease from the end of 2021. Work is currently progressing to replace LIBOR with a rate based on SONIA (Sterling Overnight Index Average). In the meantime, our forecasts are based on expected average earnings by local authorities for 3 to 12 months.
- Our forecasts for average earnings are averages i.e., rates offered by individual banks may differ significantly from these averages, reflecting their different needs for borrowing short term cash at any one point in time.

The coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings.

As shown in the forecast table above, one increase in Bank Rate from 0.10% to 0.25% has now been included in quarter 2 of 2022/23, a second increase to 0.50% in quarter 2 of 23/24 and a third one to 0.75% in quarter 4 of 23/24.

Significant risks to the forecasts

- COVID vaccines do not work to combat new mutations and/or new vaccines take longer than anticipated to be developed for successful implementation.
- The pandemic causes major long-term scarring of the economy.
- The Government implements an austerity programme that suppresses GDP growth.
- The MPC tightens monetary policy too early – by raising Bank Rate or unwinding QE.
- The MPC tightens monetary policy too late to ward off building inflationary pressures.
- Major stock markets e.g. in the US, become increasingly judged as being over-valued and susceptible to major price corrections. Central banks become increasingly exposed to the “moral hazard” risks of having to buy shares and corporate bonds to reduce the impact of major financial market sell-offs on the general economy.
- Geo-political risks are widespread e.g. German general election in September 2021 produces an unstable coalition or minority government and a void in high-profile leadership in the EU when Angela Merkel steps down as Chancellor of Germany; on-going global power influence struggles between Russia/China/US.

The balance of risks to the UK economy: -

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside, including residual risks from Covid and its variants - both domestically and their potential effects worldwide.

Forecasts for Bank Rate

Bank Rate is not expected to go up fast after the initial rate rise as the supply potential of the economy has not generally taken a major hit during the pandemic, so should be able to

cope well with meeting demand without causing inflation to remain elevated in the medium-term, or to inhibit inflation from falling back towards the MPC's 2% target after the surge to around 4% towards the end of 2021. Three increases in Bank rate are forecast in the period to March 2024, ending at 0.75%. However, these forecasts may well need changing within a relatively short time frame for the following reasons: -

- There are increasing grounds for viewing the economic recovery as running out of steam during the summer and now into the autumn. This could lead into stagflation which would create a dilemma for the MPC as to which way to face.
- Will some current key supply shortages e.g., petrol and diesel, spill over into causing economic activity in some sectors to take a significant hit?
- Rising gas and electricity prices in October and next April and increases in other prices caused by supply shortages and increases in taxation next April, are already going to deflate consumer spending power without the MPC having to take any action on Bank Rate to cool inflation. Then we have the Government's upcoming budget in October, which could also end up in reducing consumer spending power.
- On the other hand, consumers are sitting on around £200bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so when will they spend this sum, in part or in total?
- There are 1.6 million people coming off furlough at the end of September; how many of those will not have jobs on 1st October and will, therefore, be available to fill labour shortages in many sectors of the economy? So, supply shortages which have been driving up both wages and costs, could reduce significantly within the next six months or so and alleviate the MPC's current concerns.
- There is a risk that there could be further nasty surprises on the Covid front, on top of the flu season this winter, which could depress economic activity.

In summary, with the high level of uncertainty prevailing on several different fronts, it is likely that these forecasts will need to be revised again soon - in line with what the new news is.

It also needs to be borne in mind that Bank Rate being cut to 0.10% was an emergency measure to deal with the Covid crisis hitting the UK in March 2020. At any time, the MPC could decide to simply take away that final emergency cut from 0.25% to 0.10% on the grounds of it no longer being warranted and as a step forward in the return to normalisation. In addition, any Bank Rate under 1% is both highly unusual and highly supportive of economic growth.

Forecasts for PWLB rates and gilt and treasury yields

As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is likely to be a steady rise over the forecast period, with some degree of uplift due to rising treasury yields in the US.

There is likely to be **exceptional volatility and unpredictability in respect of gilt yields and PWLB rates** due to the following factors: -

- How strongly will changes in gilt yields be correlated to changes in US treasury yields?
- Will the Fed take action to counter increasing treasury yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- Would the MPC act to counter increasing gilt yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- How strong will inflationary pressures turn out to be in both the US and the UK and so impact treasury and gilt yields?
- How will central banks implement their new average or sustainable level inflation monetary policies?
- How well will central banks manage the withdrawal of QE purchases of their national bonds i.e., without causing a panic reaction in financial markets as happened in the "taper tantrums" in the US in 2013?

- Will exceptional volatility be focused on the short or long-end of the yield curve, or both?

The forecasts are also predicated on an assumption that there is no break-up of the Eurozone or EU within our forecasting period, despite the major challenges that are looming up, and that there are no major ructions in international relations, especially between the US and China / North Korea and Iran, which have a major impact on international trade and world GDP growth.

Gilt and treasury yields

Since the start of 2021, there has been a lot of volatility in gilt yields, and hence PWLB rates. During the first part of the year, US President Biden's, and the Democratic party's determination to push through a \$1.9trn (equivalent to 8.8% of GDP) fiscal boost for the US economy as a recovery package from the Covid pandemic was what unsettled financial markets. However, this was in addition to the \$900bn support package already passed in December 2020 under President Trump. This was then followed by additional Democratic ambition to spend further huge sums on infrastructure and an American families plan over the next decade which are caught up in Democrat / Republican haggling. Financial markets were alarmed that all this stimulus, which is much bigger than in other western economies, was happening at a time in the US when: -

1. A fast vaccination programme has enabled a rapid opening up of the economy.
2. The economy had already been growing strongly during 2021.
3. It started from a position of little spare capacity due to less severe lockdown measures than in many other countries. A combination of shortage of labour and supply bottle necks is likely to stoke inflationary pressures more in the US than in other countries.
4. And the Fed was still providing monetary stimulus through monthly QE purchases.

These factors could cause an excess of demand in the economy which could then unleash stronger and more sustained inflationary pressures in the US than in other western countries. This could then force the Fed to take much earlier action to start tapering monthly QE purchases and/or increasing the Fed rate from near zero, despite their stated policy being to target average inflation. It is notable that some Fed members have moved forward their expectation of when the first increases in the Fed rate will occur in recent Fed meetings. In addition, more recently, shortages of workers appear to be stoking underlying wage inflationary pressures which are likely to feed through into CPI inflation. A run of strong monthly jobs growth figures could be enough to meet the threshold set by the Fed of "substantial further progress towards the goal of reaching full employment". However, the weak growth in August, (announced 3.9.21), has spiked anticipation that tapering of monthly QE purchases could start by the end of 2021. These purchases are currently acting as downward pressure on treasury yields. As the US financial markets are, by far, the biggest financial markets in the world, any trend upwards in the US will invariably impact and influence financial markets in other countries. However, during June and July, longer term yields fell sharply; even the large non-farm payroll increase in the first week of August seemed to cause the markets little concern, which is somewhat puzzling, particularly in the context of the concerns of many commentators that inflation may not be as transitory as the Fed is expecting it to be. Indeed, inflation pressures and erosion of surplus economic capacity look much stronger in the US than in the UK. **As an average since 2011, there has been a 75% correlation between movements in 10 year treasury yields and 10 year gilt yields. This is a significant UPWARD RISK exposure to our forecasts for longer term PWLB rates. However, gilt yields and treasury yields do not always move in unison.**

There are also possible **DOWNSIDE RISKS** from the huge sums of cash that the UK populace have saved during the pandemic; when savings accounts earn little interest, it is likely that some of this cash mountain could end up being invested in bonds and so push

up demand for bonds and support their prices i.e., this would help to keep their yields down. How this will interplay with the Bank of England eventually getting round to not reinvesting maturing gilts and then later selling gilts, will be interesting to keep an eye on.

The balance of risks to medium to long term PWLB rates: -

- There is a balance of upside risks to forecasts for medium to long term PWLB rates.

A new era – a fundamental shift in central bank monetary policy

One of the key results of the pandemic has been a fundamental rethinking and shift in monetary policy by major central banks like the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB, to tolerate a higher level of inflation than in the previous two decades when inflation was the prime target to bear down on so as to stop it going above a target rate. There is now also a greater emphasis on other targets for monetary policy than just inflation, especially on 'achieving broad and inclusive "maximum" employment in its entirety' in the US before consideration would be given to increasing rates.

- The Fed in America has gone furthest in adopting a monetary policy based on a clear goal of allowing the inflation target to be symmetrical, (rather than a ceiling to keep under), so that inflation averages out the dips down and surges above the target rate, over an unspecified period of time.
- The Bank of England has also amended its target for monetary policy so that inflation should be 'sustainably over 2%' and the ECB now has a similar policy.
- **For local authorities, this means that investment interest rates and very short term PWLB rates will not be rising as quickly or as high as in previous decades when the economy recovers from a downturn and the recovery eventually runs out of spare capacity to fuel continuing expansion.**
- Labour market liberalisation since the 1970s has helped to break the wage-price spirals that fuelled high levels of inflation and has now set inflation on a lower path which makes this shift in monetary policy practicable. In addition, recent changes in flexible employment practices, the rise of the gig economy and technological changes, will all help to lower inflationary pressures.
- Governments will also be concerned to see interest rates stay lower as every rise in central rates will add to the cost of vastly expanded levels of national debt; (in the UK this is £21bn for each 1% rise in rates). On the other hand, higher levels of inflation will help to erode the real value of total public debt.

3 TREASURY MANAGEMENT POLICY STATEMENT - UPDATE

- a) The Treasury Management Policy Statement (the Statement) was approved by Council in April 2010. There have been no policy changes to the Statement. The details in this report update the position in light of updated economic position and budgetary changes.
- b) Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2021/22 was approved by Council on 19 March 2021. There are no further policy changes to the Statement. The details in this report provides an update on Treasury Management activities, including Prudential and Treasury Management Indicators.

4 COUNCIL'S CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AND FINANCING 2021/22

- 4.1** This part of the report is structured to update:
- The Council's capital expenditure plans;
 - How these plans are being financed;

- The impact of the changes in the capital expenditure plans on the prudential indicators and the underlying need to borrow; and
- Compliance with the limits in place for borrowing activity.

4.2 CAPITAL EXPENDITURE

(Prudential Indicator (PI-1))

- a) The original capital plan for 2021/22 was approved on 19 March 2021. **Table 2** shows the current budgets for capital expenditure compared to the original estimates used in the Treasury Management Strategy report for 2021/22.

Table 2	2021/22 Original Budget	2021/22 Current Approved Budget ¹	Variance Original to Current Approved
	£m	£m	£m
Assets & Infrastructure	45.6	47.1	1.5
Other Corporate Services	11.4	12.7	1.3
Children & Young People	8.3	11.2	2.9
Culture & Sport	2.9	2.5	(0.4)
Economic Regeneration	9.1	9.6	0.5
Housing Strategy & Services	0.5	0.4	(0.1)
Social Care Infrastructure	9.4	0.4	(9.0)
Emergency & Unplanned Schemes	0.2	0.3	0.1
Total Capital Expenditure (PI-1)	87.4	84.2	(3.2)

¹ Executive Committee 16 November 2021

- b) The current approved budget for 2021/22 is less than the original budget mainly due to adverse timing movements in Social Care Infrastructure (New Residential Care Homes). Detailed explanations of the movements within the planned expenditure have been reported in the ongoing monitoring reports, the last of which was to the Executive Committee on 16 November 2021.

4.3 FINANCING OF THE CAPITAL PROGRAMME

- a) **Table 3** on the following page draws together the main funding elements of the capital expenditure plans (see 4.2 above), comparing the original components of the funding strategy to those of the latest approved budget for the 2021/22 capital programme.

Table 3	2021/22 Original Budget	2021/22 Current Approved Budget ¹	Variance Original to Current Approved
	£m	£m	£m
Capital Expenditure (PI-1)	87.4	84.2	(3.2)
Other Relevant Expenditure	-	-	-

Total Expenditure	87.4	84.2	(3.2)
<i>Financed by:</i>			
Capital receipts	(1.6)	(1.4)	0.2
Capital from Revenue (CFCR)	(4.0)	(4.4)	(0.4)
Developer Contributions	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.1)
Govt. General Capital Grant	(11.1)	(32.0)	(20.9)
Govt. Specific Capital Grant	(21.4)	(3.9)	17.5
Other Grants & Contributions	(12.0)	(13.1)	(1.1)
Replacement Funds	(2.1)	(2.0)	0.1
Total Financing	(52.4)	(57.1)	(4.7)
Net Financing Need for the Year	35.0	27.1	(7.9)

¹ Executive Committee 16 November 2021

- b) The decrease in overall financing need is a combination of the reduced projected capital expenditure as detailed in table 2 above, along with a net increase in government grants. The large movement between Govt General Capital Grant and Govt Specific Capital Grant relates mainly to the Hawick FPS.

4.4 CAPITAL FINANCING REQUIREMENT AND EXTERNAL DEBT INDICATORS

CAPITAL FINANCING REQUIREMENT (CFR) (PI-2)

- i) **Table 4** below shows the CFR, which is the underlying need to incur external borrowing for a capital purpose.
- ii) The CFR has been re-calculated in light of the changes to the capital plan and the fixed asset and reserve valuations in the Council's accounts for the year ending 31 March 2021; this has resulted in a variance of £19.8m in the CFR.

Table 4	2021/22 Original estimate	2021/22 Revised estimate	Variance
	£m	£m	£m
CFR * (PI-2)	384.4	364.6	19.8

The CFR for this calculation includes current capital expenditure assumptions to 30 September 2021.

ACTUAL EXTERNAL DEBT (PI-5)

- iii) Projected external debt for 2021/22 is shown in **Table 5** below and is estimated to remain within the operational boundary.
- iv) **Table 5** also compares the current projected external borrowing estimate with the estimate in the Annual Strategy. In cash terms, the borrowing figure is lower than originally projected in line with the reduced net financing need as detailed above. A variance in cash levels held at the year-end compared to those projected also impact on the variance below.
- v) Due to the overall financial position and the timing of the capital programme, there has been no new external borrowing undertaken so far this year. It is anticipated that borrowing of £31m will be undertaken during the remainder of this financial year.

Table 5	2021/22 Original estimate	2021/22 Current Approved Budget	Variance
	£m	£m	£m
Borrowing	235.2	222.7	(12.5)
Other long-term liabilities	93.5	89.1	(4.4)
Total External Debt (PI-5)	328.7	311.8	(16.9)

(UNDER)/OVER BORROWING AGAINST CFR (PI-6)

- vi) A key control over treasury activity is a prudential indicator to ensure that, over the medium term, borrowing will only be for a capital purpose. Net external borrowing should not, except in the short term, exceed the total of CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2021/22 and next two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years.
- vii) **Table 6** compares the prudential indicator for (under)/over borrowing against CFR versus the updated estimate for the year end and shows that the Council's actual debt levels are well within its capital financing requirement. This is primarily driven by the tactical measures which use the Council's surplus cash-flows to finance capital expenditure minimising the need to enter into additional debt financing arrangements.

Table 6	2021/22 Original estimate	2021/22 Current Approved Budget	Variance
	£m	£m	£m
Gross External Debt	328.7	311.8	(16.9)
CFR *	473.3	464.9	8.4
(Under)/Over Borrowing against CFR (PI-6)	(144.6)	(153.1)	(8.5)

* The CFR for this calculation includes the current and two future years projected capital expenditure.

- viii) No difficulties are envisaged for the current or future years in complying with this prudential indicator.

AUTHORISED LIMIT AND OPERATIONAL BOUNDARY (PI-7 and PI-8)

- ix) Two further prudential indicators control the overall level of borrowing. These are:
- (i) The **Authorised Limit** which represents the limit beyond which borrowing is prohibited and the expected maximum borrowing need for the Council. It needs to be set and revised by Members. The Authorised Limit is the statutory limit determined under the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003.
 - (ii) The **Operational Boundary** which shows the expected operational debt position for the period.
- x) **Table 7** below shows revised estimates for the debt indicators for the 2021/22 financial year and compares them with the original estimates shown in the 2021/22 Treasury Management Strategy Report.

Table 7	2021/22 Original estimate	2021/22 Revised estimate	Variance £m
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	£m	£m	
Gross External Debt (PI-5)	328.7	311.8	(16.9)
Authorised Limit inc. Long Term Liabilities(PI-8a)	531.1	525.9	(5.2)
<i>Variance to External Debt Estimate</i>	<i>202.4</i>	<i>214.1</i>	<i>11.7</i>
Operational Boundary inc. Long Term Liabilities (PI-7a)	442.6	438.2	(4.4)
<i>Variance to External Debt Estimate</i>	<i>113.9</i>	<i>126.4</i>	<i>12.5</i>

4.5 DEBT RESCHEDULING

Debt rescheduling opportunities have been very limited in the current economic climate and following the various increases in the margins added to gilt yields which have impacted PWLB new borrowing rates since October 2010. No debt rescheduling has therefore been undertaken to date in the current financial year.

5 INVESTMENT ACTIVITY

5.1 INVESTMENTS

- a) In accordance with the Code, it is the Council's priority to ensure security of capital and liquidity, and to obtain an appropriate level of return which is consistent with the Council's risk appetite. As shown by the interest rate forecasts in section 2.2, it is now impossible to earn the level of interest rates commonly seen in previous decades as all short-term money market investment rates have only risen weakly since Bank Rate was cut to 0.10% in March 2020 until the MPC meeting on 24th September 2021 when 6 and 12 month rates rose in anticipation of Bank Rate going up in 2022. Given this environment and the fact that Bank Rate may only rise marginally, or not at all, before mid-2023, investment returns are expected to remain low.
- b) The Council held £32.5m of balances in interest bearing accounts as at 30 September 2021 (£27.9m at 31 March 2021). As a result of current market uncertainties, the Council has been prioritising the security of deposits by investing surplus balances with money market funds and the UK Government's Debt Management Office (DMO).
- c) The increase in the level of balances invested from March to September, highlighted above, are due to timing differences between the receipt of grant funding and corresponding capital expenditure, detailed in section 4.4 above.
- d) The Council, due to the cashflow position and the requirement to manage the Pension Fund cash as well as the Council's, continues to explore opportunities to invest surplus balances in the short term.

Creditworthiness

- e) Significant levels of downgrades to Short and Long Term credit ratings have not materialised since the crisis in March 2020. In the main, where they did change, any alterations were limited to Outlooks. However, as economies are beginning to reopen, there have been some instances of previous lowering of Outlooks being reversed.

5.2 INVESTMENT COUNTERPARTY CRITERIA

- a) The current investment counterparty criterion, approved in the Treasury Management Strategy, represents a prudent approach to risk and the Council's concerns about security

of investments. These prudent limits mean there are limited investment options when operating the cash-flow on a short term management basis.

- b) Considering security, liquidity and yield of investment, priority is given to security. Daily updates and reports are received from Link Asset Services that allow officers to assess the continued credit worthiness of investment counter parties.
- c) All investments undertaken are on a short term, highly liquid basis, allowing access to invested funds at 1 days notice.
- d) Interest rates are also monitored on a daily basis to ensure the best return is obtained. Target for internal return on cash investment is to be above the 7 Day LIBID rate. The return for six months to 30 September 2021 has averaged 0.01%, compared against an average seven day LIBID rate of $-(0.08)\%$.

LOAN CHARGES

- a) The **Loan Charges** Revenue Budget estimate contained in the Council's Financial Plans approved on 19 March 2021 was £19.466m. It is expected that charges for 2021/22 will be lower than the budgeted figure, in line with the actual and projected borrowing requirements for the year.

ANNEX A

Indicator Reference	Indicator	Page Ref.	2021/22 Original estimate	2021/22 Revised estimate
PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS				
Capital Expenditure Indicator				
PI-1	Capital Expenditure Limits (£m)	9	87.4	84.2
PI-2	Capital Financing Requirement (£m) (CFR)	10	384.4	364.6
Affordability Indicator				
PI-3	Ratio of Financing Costs to Net Revenue (inc PPP repayment costs)	N/A	8.7%	8.9%
PI-4	Incremental (Saving)/ Cost Impact of Capital Investment Decisions on Council Tax	N/A	£0.01	£(0.00)
External Debt Indicators				
PI-5	External Debt (£m)	11	328.7	311.8
PI-7a	Operational Boundary (inc. Other Long Term Liabilities) (£m)	12	442.6	438.2
PI-7b	Operational Boundary (exc. Other Long Term Liabilities) (£m)	N/A	349.1	349.1
PI-8a	Authorised Limit (inc. Other Long Term Liabilities) (£m)	12	531.1	525.9
PI-8b	Authorised Limit (exc. Other Long Term Liabilities) (£m)	N/A	437.6	436.8
Indicators of Prudence				
PI-6	(Under)/Over Net Borrowing against the CFR (£m)	11	(144.6)	(153.1)
TREASURY INDICATORS				
TI-1	Upper Limit to Fixed Interest Rates based on Net Debt (£m)		442.6	438.2
TI-2	Upper Limit to Variable Interest Rates based on Net Debt (£m)		154.9	153.4
TI-3	Maturity Structure of Fixed Interest Rate Borrowing		Lower	
	Under 12 months		0%	
	12 months to 2 years		0%	
	2 years to 5 years		0%	
	5 years to 10 years		0%	
	10 years and above		20%	
TI-4	Maximum Principal Sum invested greater than 364 days	13	20%	20%